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NOTES AND COMMENT
DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH - How MucH AND TO WHOM
Introduction
Under the common law, and as late as little more than a cen-
tury ago, no action would lie to recover damages for the death of a
human being occasioned by the wrongful or negligent act of another,
however close the relationship might have been between the deceased
and the survivor and however clearly the death may have involved
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.' The operation of the common law
rule frequently caused great hardship to the surviving family and
next of kin of the deceased. At last, in view of the absurdity of
the situation and the fact that there was no sensible reason why a
defendant should pay damages for scratching his victim and yet
escape all liability for negligently causing death, legislation was in-
troduced about the middle of the nineteenth century to modify or
abrogate the severity of the common law and to furnish a remedy
for the bereaved, and often destitute family.
In 1846, the English Parliament led the way by passing the
Fatal Accidents Act or what is more commonly known as Lord
Campbell's Act.2 It was speedily followed in this country by acts
having in view the same general purpose.3
Since limitations of space preclude a detailed analysis of wrong-
ful death statutes in general, it is intended to confine the discussion
herein to but two of their many aspects. They are: First, the
elements of damages recoverable in actions brought under such
statutes; and Second, those persons to whom distribution of such
damages will be made.
See Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). For a
critique of the common law rule, see 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 333-336 (1934).
29 & 10 VicT. c. 93 (1846) which provided:
§ 1. ". . . whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default .... the person who would have been liable if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured. .. ."
§ 2. ". . every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent, and child of the person . . . and shall be brought by and in the name
of the executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such
action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the
injury resulting from such death to the parties, respectively, for whom and for
whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered . ..
shall be divided amongst the before mentioned parties in such shares as the
jury by their verdict, shall find and direct."
3 For a survey of wrongful death liability, see Coliseum Motor Co. v.
Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P. 2d 105 (1931).
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As representative of state wrongful death statutes, those of
New York 4 will be used herein; and since the federal death acts,5
so far as they are applicable, have superseded both the common law
and the state statutes, we have chosen the most important and most
comprehensive of these, to wit: the Federal Employer's Liability
Act,0 for the purposes of discussion which will follow.
Finally, just as the applicability of a federal death statute auto-
matically excludes the applicability of state laws, neither the federal
nor state statutes control when the death arises out of a case that
falls within the scope of an international treaty.
In the light of the ever-growing frequency of international air
travel, and hence the expanding prominence of the rules adopted
by the Convention at Warsaw in 1929, and followed by the United
States since 1934,7 it becomes necessary to consider its effects on
wrongful death recoveries.
Background of the New York and of the Federal Statute
Only one year after the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act in
England, the New York Legislature, acknowledging the wisdom of,
and the necessity for such remedial legislation, followed with an
acts which in almost exactly the same language gave to the personal
representative of one whose death had been caused by the wrong-
doing of another, a statutory right of action for damages for the
benefit of the next of kin.9 This act was amended in 184910 by
limiting the amount of recovery in this type of action to $5,000. This
limitation continued in force until by the constitution of 1894, the
cause of action became constitutionally guaranteed by the provision
that the "right ... shall never be abrogated; and the amount recov-
able shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." 11 This, however,
does not preclude the legislature from changing the designation of
the persons amongst whom the proceeds shall be divided.12
4 N. Y. Dwc. EST. LAW §§ 130-134.
5 E.g., Death on the High Seas Act, 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U. S. C.
§ 761 (1946) (death occurring "on the high seas beyond a marine league" from
the mainland); Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1915), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1946)(death of merchant seamen) ; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950 (1946); Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60(1946) (death of employee of carrier engaged in inter-state commerce).
635 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60 (1946). Whenever
the words "federal act" or "federal statute" are used herein, the FELA is
meant unless otherwise indicated.
7 U. S. TRFATY SER. No. 876 (1934).
8 Laws of N. Y. 1847, c. 450, §§ 1, 2.
9 For a history of the wrongful death statute in N. Y., see In re Meng,
96 Misc. 126, 159 N. Y. Supp. 535 (Surr. Ct 1916).
10 Laws of N. Y. 1849, c. 246.
"IN. Y. CoNsT. Art I, § 18. This became Article I, Section 16, of the
Constitution of 1938.
12I re Meng, 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E. 264 (1919).
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The Federal Employers' Liability Act had its inception in 190613
and was intended by Congress to regulate the liability of railroad
companies engaged in interstate commerce to their employees while
engaged in such commerce. Prior to this act Congress had not
deemed it expedient to legislate upon the subject although its power
was ample. One year later however, the act of 1906 was declared
unconstitutional as being so broad that it might cover cases of in-
trastate commerce.14  It was immediately followed by the Second
Federal Employers' Liability Act.' and its constitutionality was
sustained by concluding that it was a valid exercise of the power
of Congress to regulate commerce among the states.'
It is generally recognized that both the New York 17 and the
federal statute' s confer a new, original, and distinct cause of ac-
tion, unknown to the common law '9 and one which is essentially
in the nature of a suit for injury to the property rights which the
named beneficiary has in the life of the decedent on whom he is,
or may be dependent, or to whose services he is entitled.2 0
Scope of the Statutes
As would be expected, an action lies under the New York
statute only for a death resulting from a wrong committed within
the state 21 except, when the wrong is perpetrated outside the state,
and there exists in such foreign state a statute authorizing a recov-
ery on grounds substantially similar to those in force in New
13 34 STAT. 232 (1906).
14 Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1907).
1535 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §51 (1946).
16 In re Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
17 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 130:
"The executor or administrator . . . of a decedent who has left him or her
surviving a husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to recover
damages for a wrongful act, neglect, or default, by which the decedent's death
was caused. .. ."
1s35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1946), providing:
"Every common carrier . . . shall be liable in damages . . . in case of the
death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit
of the surviving widow and husband and children . . . ; and, if none, then
of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent
upon such employee for such . . . death resulting . . . from the negligence
... of such carrier...."
19 See, e.g., Mossip v. F. H. Clement & Co., 256 App. Div. 469, 10 N. Y. S.
2d 592 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'd without opinion, 283 N. Y. 554, 27 N. E. 2d
279 (1940); Greco v. S. F. Kresge Co., 161 Misc. 781, 293 N. Y. Supp. 53(Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 251 App. Div. 667, 297 N. Y. Supp. 258 (2d Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557. See Note, 115 A. L. R. 1020 (1938):
Siso v. Kleiner, 185 Misc. 154, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Fogarty
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 85 Wash. 90, 147 Pac. 652 (1915) (FELA).
20 Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corp., 273 App. Div. 4, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 818 (1st
Dep't 1947); In re Brennan's Account, 160 App. Div. 401, 145 N. Y. Supp.
440 (2d Dep't 1914).
21 Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N. Y. 130, 61 N. E. 2d 412 (1945).
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York. In such a case, New York courts may entertain the death
action by way of comity.22 Even where the wrong has been com-
mitted in New York, circumstances may render the New York law
inapplicable as in a case where the Federal Employers' Liability
Act would control.
The federal act regulates solely the liability of carriers engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce.23 For the act to apply the de-
fendant carrier, at the time of the accident, must have been engaged
in interstate commerce, and plaintiff's decedent must have been
employed by the carrier in such commerce.24  Once it has been
determined that the act applies, it then becomes paramount and
exclusive and it can neither be extended nor abridged by the common
or statutory laws of any state.25  The act itself provides for con-
current jurisdiction by state and federal courts ;26 however, the deci-
sions of the federal courts determining questions of construction,
applicability, and rights and liabilities of the parties under the act
are binding upon the state courts.27 Hence, it follows that no state
limitation on recovery can apply to an action brought under the
federal act.28
The Theory of Damages and the Elements Admissible
Both the New York and the federal actions proceed on the
theory of compensating the individual beneficiaries for the loss of
economic benefit which they might reasonably have expected to
receive from the decedent during the remainder of his lifetime if
he had not been tortiously killed,29 and in New York the damages
awarded to the plaintiff:
... may be such sum as the jury upon a writ of inquiry, or upon a trial,
or where issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court, or the referee,
22 Zeikus v. Florida East Coast Ry., 144 App. Div. 91, 128 N. Y. Supp. 933
(Ist Dep't 1911).
23 See note 18 supra.24 Erie R. R. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303 (1916); Shanks v. Delaware, L. &
W. R. R., 239 U. S. 556 (1916). See Delisi, Scope of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act-Recent Developments, 18 Miss. L. J. 206 (1947).
25 "If it is a case wherein relief may be properly had under the federal act,
it supersedes the common law of the state and any recovery . . . must neces-
sarily be based upon the federal act." Cincinnati, etc., R. R. v. Clark, 169
Ky. 662, 185 S. W. 94, 97 (1916). However, the employee still retains his
common law right to sue any third party who is jointly liable for the injury.
Cott v. Erie R. R., 231 N. Y. 67, 131 N. E. 737 (1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S.
636 (1921).
2635 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1046).27Hopps' Estate v. Chesnut, 324 Mich. 256, 36 N. W. 2d 908 (1949);
Southern Ry. v. Melton, 240 Ala. 244, 198 So. 588 (1940).28 Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 52 (1915).
29 E. g., 2 CLARK, NEW YORK LAW OF DAMAGES § 538 et seq. (1925).
See 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(c), 1949 Report N. Y. Law Revision Commission;
Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913) (FELA).
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deems to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting
from the decedent's death to the person or persons for whose benefit the action
is brought.3 0
The federal act contains no such clear-cut direction as to the measure
of damages, but by court decision the gravamen of recovery has
been held to be the aforesaid pecuniary loss.31  Simply stated then,
under the above theory, damages in death cases determined by ascer-
taining the monetary loss suffered by the surviving relatives on whose
behalf the executor or administrator acts 32 and it should be noted
that this theory is expressly sanctioned by the terms of Lord Camp-
bell's Act, the original death statute,33 which provided that:
• . . the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the
injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom or for
whose benefit such action shall be brought.
This theory it may be said in passing is in direct contrast with the
doctrine prevailing in many states which measure the recovery by
the loss to the estate of the deceased. 34  Under the "pecuniary loss"
theory the relational interest 5 of the beneficiaries is protected.
Damages are given for injury to the interest which one member of
the family has by reason of his family relation to the deceased.
Speaking of this, McCormick has the following to say:
It represents merely a protection, after the death of the injured members, of
the survivor's familial interests which are asserted during the lifetime of the
injured persons through such actions as the husband's for injury to his wife,
or the father's claim for loss of the services of his injured son.3 G
The basis of recovery is the "expectancy disappointed by death"
of the surviving relatives of the decedent to receive financial bene-
fits from him had his life continued.37  Thus the damages include
the aggregate total of the demonstrated losses of the surviving spouse
and next of kin who can prove that they probably would have re-
ceived financial benefits from the decedent had he lived.
The inherent difficulty of laying down comprehensive rules for
the estimation of damages has been recognized by the courts from
the beginning. It must be apparent that ultimately the determination
3o N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 132.
31 Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913).
32 Judgments recovered do not constitute assets of the estate of the de-
ceased but are a special fund, the distribution of which is limited to persons
designated by the statute. Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389 (1873); In re
Butler, 20 F. Supp. 995 (D. C. Va. 1937) (FELA).
33 See note 2 supra; Blake v. Midland R. R., 18 Q. B. 93 (1852).
34 For a discussion of both theories and of damages for death in general,
see MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 93-106 (1935).
35 See Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rav. 460, 470 (1934).
36 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 347 (1935).
37 Loetsch v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 291 N. Y. 308, 52 N. E. 2d
448 (1943).
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of the amount recoverable depends on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.38 The Court of Appeals has stated:
The pecuniary loss in any such case may be composed of very different ele-
ments. It may consist of special damages, that is of an actual, definite loss,
capable of proof, and of measurement with approximate accuracy; and also
of prospective and general damages, incapable of precise and accurate estimate
because of contingencies of the unknown future. . . . the damages to the
next of kin in that respect are necessarily indefinite, prospective, and contin-
gent. They cannot be proved with even an approach to accuracy ... Human
lives are not all of the same value to the survivors.
The age and sex, the general health and intelligence of the person killed, the
situation and condition of the survivors and their relation to the deceased; these
elements furnish some basis for judgment. That it is slender and inadequate
is true; but it is all that is possible, and while that should be given, more cannot
be required.39
It is clear that the complicating factor in each case is the large
element of speculation involved, and the dependency on the life ex-
pectancy of both the deceased 40 and the person or persons for
whose benefit the action is brought.41 The fact that the deceased
was engaged in a hazardous occupation is material in determining his
life expectancy. 42 Thus, though mortality tables may be introduced
into evidence, they are not controlling on the jury.43 The victim's
38 Liubowsky v. State, 260 App. Div. 416, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (3d Dep't),
aff'd without opinion, 285 N. Y. 701, 34 N. E. 2d 385 (1940).
39 Finch, J., in Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 92 N. Y. 219, 225
(1883).
40 Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F. 2d 353 (2d Cir. 1937).
41 Briscoe v. United States, 65 F. 2d 404 (2d Cir. 1933) ; In re Uravic's
Estate, 142 Misc. 775, 255 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Surr. Ct. 1932). The expectancy
of the beneficiary is a vital consideration since the lesser of the two expec-
tancies determines the measure of damages for the reason that it terminates
the possibility of pecuniary benefits accruing. Mortality tables based on thejoint lives of both may be introduced. See Lewis v. State, 112 Misc. 667, 183
N. Y. Supp. 653 (Ct. Cl. 1920), reV'd on other grounds, 197 App. Div. 712,
189 N. Y. Supp. 560 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd withoud opihdon, 234 N. Y. 587,
138 N. E. 457 (1922) ; Haidacker v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 52 F. Supp.
713 (D. C. N. Y. 1943) (FELA).
42 Sibert v. Litchfield & M. Ry., 159 S. W. 2d 612 (Mo. 1942) (where a
51-year-old railroad brakeman was treated as 54 years of age with a life ex-
pectancy of eighteen and nine-tenths years because of his hazardous employ-
ment) ; Jones v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 143 La. 307, 78 So. 568 (1918) (in
determining the life expectancy of a locomotive engineer, the court adopted
the practice of insurance companies of adding eight years to age because of
hazardous occupation).
43 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Holloway, 246 U. S. 525 (1918), aoflrining 168
Ky. 262, 181 S. W. 1126 (1916) (defendant not entitled as a matter of law
to have it declared that decedent would not have survived his probable
expectancy).
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character, 44 health,45 habits,46 earning capacity,47 chances of worldly
success, and past contributions to his family,48 all must be weighed
together with the vicissitudes of an uncertain future to arrive at
the value of the loss caused to the survivors by the untimely inter-
vention of death.49  It has even been held that the devaluation of
the dollar and its decreased purchasing power may be considered
in assessing the monetary value of the loss. 50
Since human lives are of varied value to the survivors and since
pecuniary loss is the-sole measure of damage, it may well be asked,
"Can a human life be taken with no resultant loss?" It has been
held that no pecuniary loss is produced by the death of a person
who is incurably insane and confined to a state hospital with no
prospects of ever being released. 51 Damages there are restricted
to the funeral expenses.52  However, the mere fact that the statute
gives the right of action seems to indicate that nominal damages, at
44 Sternfels v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 73 App. Div. 494, 77 N. Y. Supp. 309
(1st Dep't 1902), aff'd without opinion, 174 N. Y. 512, 66 N. E. 1117 (1903).
45 Ibid.
46 McIlwaine v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 74 App. Div. 496, 77 N. Y. Supp.
426 (1st Dep't 1902).
47 Seifter v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 55 App. Div. 10, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1107
(2d Dep't 1900), reild on other grounds, 169 N. Y. 254, 62 N. E. 349 (1901).
Under the FELA, plaintiff is not limited to his earnings from the defendant
carrier, but may submit for the consideration of the jury, his earnings from
any other business in which he was engaged, Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Humphries,
174 Miss. 459, 164 So. 22 (1935) (denying defendant's argument that income
outside of railroad earnings have no relation to interstate commerce and could
not be considered in awarding damages under FELA).
48 Wethers v. N. Y. Cent. P. R., 120 Misc. 830, 199 N. Y. Supp. 875 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 207 App. Div. 810, 201 N. Y. Supp. 957 (1st Dep't
1923). The decedent's earnings alone are not the test of the beneficiaries' loss.
It is that portion of his future earnings that might reasonably have been
bestowed on them, had he not been killed. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Humphries,
170 Miss. 840, 155 So. 421 (1934).
4 See, e.g., Dimitroff v. State, 171 Misc. 635, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 458 (Ct. Cl.
1939); In re Mangan's Estate, 162 Misc. 495, 294 N. Y. Supp. 974 (Surr. Ct.
1937); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 188 S. W. 2d 447(1944) (FELA).
5o Liddie v. State, 190 Misc. 347, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 182 (Ct. Cl. 1947) ; Burtman
v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 271 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Culver v. Union
Pac. R. R., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794 (1924) (FELA). Contra: Edwards
v. Southern Ry., 184 S. E. 370 (Ga. App. 1936) (FELA).51 St. Pierre v. State, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 151 (Ct. Cl. 1942), affd mem., 272 App.
Div. 973, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 608 (3d Dep't 1947); Grosso v. State, 177 Misc.
690, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 398 (Ct. Cl. 1941), aff'd without opinion, 264 App. Div.
745, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 440 (3d Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion, 289 N. Y.
552, 43 N. E. 2d 530 (1943) (where inmate of institution for defective de-
linquents though 28 years old, had a mental age of six years and nine months,
and an I. Q. of 42, and there were no prospects of his being paroled and his
past record indicated he'd never be of assistance to his family, held, the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish indefinite and prospective damages for his
death). It is extremely doubtful that such a case would arise under the
FELA where the deceased must be an employee of an interstate carrier.
52 St. Pierre v. State, supra note 51. For a discussion of funeral expenses
as an element of damages, see infra.
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least, may be had where the negligence of the defendant is estab-
lished,53 and in the absence of confinement or insanity of the dece-
dent, it would seem that there is a presumption that his wife and
minor children have suffered pecuniary loss, and they may recover
without proof of actual loss.54 This presumption is based on the
legal obligation to support and hence the fact that no contribution
was in truth received during the victim's life is deemed immaterial.55
Bearing in mind that pecuniary loss to the survivors is the
criterion, it follows that the pain and suffering undergone by the
decedent between the time of injury and the time of death are
not proper elements of damage under the death statute. Such is
the case in New York 50 where such damages plus the loss of earn-
ings during lifetime are allocated to an action brought under the
survival statutes.57  By the New York law, the recovery in that
action is expressly for the benefit of the estate 58 and the action may
be prosecuted concurrently with the death action provided that a
separate verdict is rendered as to each cause of action.59
In the matter of survival, the federal act differs in certain
respects from the law of New York. By a 1910 amendment, the
survival of the right of action was provided for, and the beneficiaries
were permitted to recover not only for their pecuniary loss, but also
for the pain and suffering endured by the decedent.60 It should be
53 Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432 (1857).
54 In re Uravic, 142 Misc. 775, 255 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
"When the relation between the deceased and the beneficial plaintiff is either
that of husband and wife or parent and minor child, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, actual pecuniary loss will be presumed from the death."
Gilliam v. Southern R. R., 108 S. C. 195, 93 S. E. 865, 867 (1917) ; cf. Norfolk,
etc., R. R. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625 (1915), wherein, a charge to the jury
that ". . . the widow and infant children of decedent are entitled to larger
damages than would be the case of persons suing who were more distantly
related," was held erroneous.551n re Uravic, supra note 54.
56 N. Y. Dxc. EST. LAW § 132. "Neither the personal wrong or outrage
to the decedent, nor the pain and suffering he may have endured, are to be
taken into account. This would be the foundation of the action, and would
furnish the criterion of damages if death had not ensued, and the injured party
had brought the suit. But the claim of the administrator and through him
of the next of kin, is altogether different." Comstock, J., in Quin v. Moore,\
15 N. Y. 432, 435 (1857).
57 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAw §§ 119-120.
58 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAw § 120. See Note, The Wrongful Death Act as
Affected by the Surzival Statute, 15 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 58 (1940).
59 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 120.
6036 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 59 (1946); St. Louis, etc., R. P. v.
Craft, 237 U. S. 648 (1915). Once it has been established that the decedent
has suffered for an appreciable time before death, it becomes the function of
the jury to determine the damages, and the only limitation upon the amount
of the award is that it must be within reason; cf. Bimberg v. Northern Pac.
R. R., 217 Minn. 187, 14 N. W. 2d 410, 416 (1944), in which case the court
stated: "The FELA places no ceiling on recoveries under the act, nor does
it fix an hourly or per diem rate for conscious pain and suffering which would
have been a distinct legislative innovation."
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noted, that while expressly on behalf of the estate in New York.
this recovery is explicitly for the benefit of the named beneficiaries
by the terms of the federal act,6' and unlike the New York statute,
the FELA does not require separate verdicts or apportionment of
the damages between the action for pain and suffering and wrongful
death. 6
2
Having determined some of the factors which are deemed
material in reaching the monetary loss, it is now in order to discuss
some of those which are excluded from the consideration of the jury.
As early as the decision in Blake v. Midland R. Co.,O6 which in con-
struing Lord Campbell's Act, ruled out damages for the grief of
the survivors, the New York courts have invariably excluded the
loss of companionship and consortium of the deceased,64 mental
anguish of his family 65 and other incidents of family association as
items of damage for the reason that they are too uncertain in their
nature, incapable of direct proof and hence inestimable. For like
reasons, the same result has been reached under the FELA.66
Undoubtedly, the fear of allowing sympathetic juries to evaluate
the bereavement of the widow and orphans lies back of the reluctance
to compensate for the love lost, the sorrow caused, and the senti-
ments wounded. In a word, nothing beyond the material contribu-
tions which may have reasonably been expected is awarded, save
that the child's loss of parental care and guidance and the value to
the child of his parents' efforts devoted to his moral and educational
training may be considered.6 7 Difficult as it is to estimate the value
of such training, if proven, it is allowed. Likewise, if the widow can
show that she had received valuable help and advice in the manage-
ment of her separate estate or in the conduct of a business of her
61 St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Rodgers, 118 Ark. 263, 176 S. W. 696 (1915).
6236 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 59 (1946); Frabutt v. New York C.
& St. L. R. R., 84 F. Supp. 460 (D. C. Pa. 1949). We deal no further with
the many interesting problems arising in conjunction with survival actions since
they are not germane to the discussion.
63 18 Q. B. 93, 111 (1852), wherein the court stated:
". .. if the jury were to proceed to estimate the respective degrees of
mental anguish of a widow and twelve children from the death of the father
of the family, a serious danger might arise of damages being given to the ruin
of the defendants."
64 Lewis v. State, 112 Misc. 667, 183 N. Y. Supp. 653 (Ct. Cl. 1920), revd
on other grounds, 197 App. Div. 712, 189 N. Y. Supp. 560 (3d Dep't 1921),
aff'd without opinion, 234 N. Y. 587, 138 N. E. 457 (1922).65 Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 177 N. Y. 379, 69 N. E. 729 (1904).
66 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Holloway, 168 Ky. 262, 181 S. W. 1126 (1916),
aff'd, 246 U. S. 525 (1918).
67 Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Cornett, 214 Ala. 23, 106 So. 242
(1925), (FELA). Contra: Davis v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R., 172 Ky. 55, 188
S. W. 1061 (1916) (FELA). This is especially so where the decedent was
the mother of the child. Tilley v. Hudson River R. R., 29 N. Y. 252 (1864).
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own, she would presumably be entitled to show this as a pecuniary
loss.68
Naturally, when the victim is a child,69 or the wife and mother,
rather than the husband and father, special facts must be considered
in computing the damages suffered. Chief among the injuries sus-
tained by the husband at the death of his wife is the loss of house-
hold services and the material value of any aid she was expected
to render in his business. 70 Generally speaking, damages for the
death of a minor child consist of the net value of services it was
expected to render during minority plus such services and contribu-
tions as could reasonably be expected after majority, minus the
probable cost of rearing the child.7 1  The court will look to the age,
sex, general health and capacities of the child, the situation and
condition of the survivors and to the possibility that the parent
might in future look to the child for support.72 It appears that where
the deceased is an adult child, the pecuniary loss would be the pres-
ent value of services and the contributions actually shown.
7 3
In every wrongful death case, once the loss has been ascertained,
it is discounted so that its worth may be determined for present pay-
ment 74 and the fact that the beneficiaries of the action have suc-
ceeded to the property of the deceased, 75 or have collected life in-
surance,76 or have become entitled to a pension 77 is not admissible
in mitigation of damages as the damages are concerned with benefits
6 8 See Michigan Cent. P. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 74 (1913) (FELA).
On the grounds that such services were capable of pecuniary measurement,
recovery has been allowed the Widow for certain services rendered by the de-
ceased such as repairing the premises, working the garden, and caring for the
livestock, Western & A. R. R. v. Hughes, 37 Ga. App. 771, 142 S. E. 185
(1928) (FELA).
69 See Note, Elements of Compensation for Death of a Minor Child, 16
MINN. L. REv. 409 (1932).
70 Steenberg v. Lewis, 221 App. Div. 808, 223 N. Y. Supp. 444 (3d Dep't
1927).
71 The relationship of parent and child alone is not enough. A reasonable
expectation of pecuniary benefit must be alleged. Boettcher v. Auslender, 76
Colo. 399, 232 Pac. 683 (1925) (FELA). Where the deceased is a minor, a
reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit is sufficient to sustain a recovery
though the child has not contributed to the support of his parents. Moffet
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 220 Fed. 39 (4th Cir. 1914).72 Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 92 N. Y. 219 (1883).73 McCord v. Schaff, 279 Mo. 558, 216 S. W. 320 (1920) (FELA);
Erickson v. Bork, 225 App. Div. 188, 232 N. Y. Supp. 379 (4th Dep't 1929).
See also CLARK, Nmv YORK LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 556-557 (1925); McCOR-
oicK, DAMAGES § 86 (1935).
74 McCoR?.IcK, DAMAGES § 86 (1935); Simmons v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay.
Co., 153 La. 405, 96 So. 12 (1923) (FELA) (discount of estimated future
contributions to beneficiaries' support at the rate of 5% per annum approved).7 5 Terry v. Jewett, 78 N. Y. 338 (1879).
76 Kellog v. New York Cent.. P., 79 N. Y. 72 (1879) ; Brabhani v. Bal-
timore & 0. R. R., 220 Fed. 35 (4th Cir. 1914) (FELA).
77 Geary v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 73 App. Div. 441, 77 N. Y. Supp. 54 (1st
Dep't 1902).
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to be derived from continued living not with those arising on account
of death.
The question of whether exemplary or punitive damages may
be had in such actions was settled early by the pronouncement that
under Lord Campbell's Act, pecuniary loss was the only basis for
recovery 78 and such damages are precluded by the New York statute
which also limits the recovery to the pecuniary loss, and by the
federal statute which has been construed to contain the same limita-
tion.7 1
The problem of funeral and medical expenses has been resolved
in New York by the statute itself which states:
. .. in addition to any other lawful element of the damages recoverable, the
reasonable expenses of medical aid, nursing and attention incident to the injury
causing death and the reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent paid by a
husband or wife or next of kin or for the paymient of which any such person
is responsible, also shall be deemed proper elements of damnage.8 0  (Italics
ours.)
Thus it is seen that so long as the requirement of the statute has
been met, and the beneficiary either has paid or is responsible for
the payment of these expenses, they are proper items of damage.
However, because no like phraseology is present in the federal act,
the courts have consistently held that funeral expenses form no ele-
ment of the danages recoverable."' It would seem that medical
costs are likewise excluded.8 2  In New York, the jury, employing
as its measure, "pecuniary injury" prescribed by law, and including
in its judgment all the permissible items discussed above, determines
the loss of the plaintiff and to the "fair and just compensation" so
awarded, "The clerk must add . . . interest thereupon from the
decedent's death ... ." 83 Since the FELA makes no provision for
the award of interest, it has been held that interest from the time
of death cannot be allowed on a verdict reached under that act.
84
78 Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q. B. 93 (1852).
79 Wagner v. Clausen & Son Brewing Co., 146 App. Div. 70, 130 N. Y.
Supp. 584 (1st Dep't 1911) ; Cain v. Southern Ry., 199 Fed. 211 (E. D. Tenn.
1911) (FELA). Contra: Ennis v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 118 Miss. 509, 79
So. 73 (1918).8 0 N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 132. This provision was added by Laws of N. Y.
1935, c. 224.
81 Heffner v. Pennsylvania R. R., 81 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir. 1936).
82 New York Central & H. R. R_ v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360 (1917).
Contra: Berry v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 324 Mo. 775, 26 S. W. 2d 988
(1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 765 (1930).
83 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAw § 132.84 Murrman v. New York N. H. & H. R. R, 258 N. Y. 447, 180 N. E. 114
(1932) (FELA).
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Beneficiaries and Apportionment of the Recovery.
Having concluded an analysis of the elements of damages for
wrongful death, and of the factors composing the recovery and final
judgment, it is appropriate to turn to the question of the distribution
of that amount. Who is to benefit from what has been awarded,
and to what extent: does each beneficiary participate in the distribu-
tion?
Inasmuch as each act names the parties on whose behalf the
action is brought, the answer to the question may best be had by
examining the statutes themselves. The FELA creates three classes
of beneficiaries.8 5 If there is a surviving spouse or children, all
other persons are excluded; if there are no members of the first
class, but there are parents, next of kin are excluded; if there are
no members of the first two classes, next of kin dependent upon the
employee may recover. 86 The order of priority of the beneficiaries
is determined by the relationship they bear to the deceased, not by
their dependency upon him. The mere existence of beneficiaries of
one class, whether or not they have suffered a pecuniary loss, will
preclude a recovery in behalf of a beneficiary of a lower class even
though the latter has sustained pecuniary loss.8 7 However, this
rule does not apply as among the members of a particular class. 88
If there are no representatives of any class described in the statute,
there can be no recovery. 9 While only pecuniary loss is needed on
which to predicate a recovery in favor of members of the first two
classes, when a recovery in behalf of the next of kin is sought, some
degree 9 0 of dependency must be shown.91 There is present in the
85 See note 18 stepra.8 1it re Stone, 173 N. C. 208, 91 S. E. 852 (1917), error dismissed, 245 U. S.
638 (1918).87 Chicago, & B. & Q. R. R. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S. 161
(1927) (where the deceased left surviving a mother and a sister, and the mother
died prior to the appointment of an administrator, the court held that the de-
pendent sister could not bring an action for wrongful death even though she
was then "next of kin" because the cause of action vested in the mother at the
son's death).
88 "We are not warranted in treating as an antecedent class the nearer next
of kin who are not dependent. That would be to rewrite the statute. Con-
gress has created three classes, not four or more. Yet to hold that the ex-
istence of nearer next of kin who are not dependent bars recovery by more
remote next of kin who are dependent is to assume that the former constitute
a preferred class. Congress, however, placed all next of kin in one class."
Poff v. Pennsylvania R. R., 327 U. S. 399. 401 (1946).
89 I, re Stone, 173 N. C. 208, 91 S. E. 852 (1917), error dismissed, 245
U. S. 638 (1918).
90 It is not necessary that the next of kin be completely, or subltantially,
or materially dependent upon the deceased; a partial dependency may be a
sufficient basis for an award. Smith v. Pryor, 195 Mo. App. 259, 190 S. W.
69 (1916).
91 Smith v. Pryor, supra note 90. The word dependent in the statute has
been construed to refer only to the next of kin. Berg v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 108 S. C. 63, 93 S. E. 390 (1917).
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act no language requiring apportionment of the damages recovered
and although at least one early case held apportionment to be the
duty of the jury; 92 this was later held to be permissive rather than
mandatory.93
Today, the law of New York in the matter of beneficiaries and
apportionment has for the most part been brought into conformity
with the federal act. Before the 1949 revision of the Decedent Estate
Law, the final award, though measured by the pecuniary loss of the
survivors, was distributed in accordance with the provisions of the
statute governing intestate distribution and hence the express intent
to compensate for loss was in effect thwarted, with the occasional
result that some collateral who actually suffered no monetary injury
might share in the recovery. 94 The hardship produced by the
prior law is mirrored in the case of Snedeker v. Snedeker,95 where
by the operation of the intestacy statute, a widow left without visible
means of support was nevertheless forced to share the net amount
of the judgment with the father of the adult victim although the
father could show no pecuniary loss.
By the 1949 revision, the manifestly illogical and unjust re-
quirement that the damages be distributed as if they were unbe-
queathed assets was abolished, and the inconsistency was rectified.
The statute 96 now provides that the damages:
... must be distributed . .. in proportion to the pecuniary injuries suffered,
the proportion to be determined upon notice to all interested persons in such
manner as the court shall deem proper after a hearing ...
However, it is submitted that while it adheres to the pecuniary
loss standard, the present law is not entirely clear as to beneficiaries.
Whereas FELA expressly divided the distributees into three classes.
no such classification has ever appeared in the New York statute.
Nevertheless, since the statute prior to revision declared that any
recovery was to be distributed in accordance with the intestacy
statute, a division into classes resulted.9 7  For example: when a
spouse and children survived, Y of the proceeds went to the spouse,
and 2Y3 to the children, parents and collaterals being automatically
excluded. So also, when a wife and no issue survived, the parents
of the deceased, and if none, his collaterals necessarily became mem-
bers of the class of beneficiaries. And so, although Section 133
merely says that the damages are to be for the benefit of the "hus-
band or wife, and next of kin," the inter-relation of the two statutes
resulted in one class necessarily taking to the exclusion of others.
92 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173 (1913).
93 Central Vermont R. R. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915).
94 Matter of Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 58 N. E. 4 (1900).
Or Ibid.
06 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 133, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 639.
9' N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 83.
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This was the state of the law at the turn of the century. In 1911,
subdivision one was added to Section 133, providing that when a
spouse and no issue survived, the recovery is for the sole benefit
of the spouse. This provision seems to have been added to prevent
a situation from arising such as that in the Snedeker case 98 where
a wealthy parent who demonstrated no pecuniary loss, participated
in the distribution of damages recovered. As of 1911 then, distribu-
tion still followed the terms of the intestacy statute except, that
when a spouse survived without issue, the next of kin who would
ordinarily be entitled to share in intestacy were expressly excluded
by subdivision one.99 The other subdivisions of Section 133 were
added by the legislature from time to time seemingly to correct abuses
that might result, were the intestacy statute to control absolutely.
In the event of the named contingency, abandonment of the deceased.
the abandoning parent or spouse was barred notwithstanding the
operation of the intestacy statute.
The case of the adult child, completely self-dependent, who could
show no loss and who nevertheless received 2/3 of the recovery
remained perplexing. To remedy this remaining inequity, the 1949
revision changed the theory of distribution and now damages are
distributable in proportion to the pecuniary loss sustained.10 0 It
would thus appear that a new problem is engendered. Section 133
never divided the beneficiaries into classes and does not do so today.
During the period when the intestacy statute as modified by the
subdivisions of Section 133 defined the pattern, there was no doubt
but that classes resulted. When the intestacy statute is no longer
a correlative of the death statute, what becomes of the classes that
the concomitance of the two created? Unlike the FELA, Section
133 names no classes. Will they be implied?
Since the death statute now directs distribution in proportion
to the pecuniary injuries suffered, a possible construction would
permit a recovery by any spouse or next of kin showing a loss. As-
suming that the survivors are a wife, no children, and a dependent
brother, and the recovery is the aggregate of the losses shown by
both, why should not each take a proportional share? Yet, subdi-
vision one of Section 133 expressly provides that where a spouse
and no issue survives, the damages are solely for the spouse. Was
not subdivision one adopted to remedy an injustice produced by the
intestacy statute where a non-dependent parent or collateral suffer-
ing no loss could share in the recovery simply by virtue of his
relationship to the deceased? Now such a result is impossible for
there can be no recovery without showing loss. When the reason
for including said subdivision was eliminated, it would appear that
98 Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 58 N. E. 4 (1900).
99 Matter of Meng, 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E. 508 (1919).WoN. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 133. See 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), 1949 Re-
port, N. Y. Law Revision Commission.
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the need for the subdivision vanished as well, and that its retention
is anomalous and vestigial. Subdivision one, it will be remembered,
applies only when a spouse and no children survive, and in such
case, all but the wife are expressly excluded. When children as
well as a spouse survive, the body of Section 133 applies. The body
of the section provides for distribution in proportion to the pecuniary
injury. Is it not paradoxical to assume that the brother in the above
hypothetical might share when a wife and children remain, because he
can show a loss (which is all the body of the section now requires)
and yet be expressly precluded from sharing when a wife alone sur-
vives, in consequence of the express words of the first subdivision?
The same argument may be extended by analogy to the other subdivi-
sions of Section 133. No cases in point have arisen as yet, however
there is a likelihood that they will. When they do arise, there is no
indication that the courts will construe the statute as suggested
above. In all probability, the courts will adept the remaining alter-
native and hold that the beneficiaries are divided into classes by
implication. The reasoning back of this construction might be that
the legislature in revising the statute, did not intend to abrogate the
effect of the intestacy statute in creating classes but merely aimed
at rectifying the evil with regard to apportionment within the class.
In support of this latter construction, it might be urged that while
the intestacy statute no longer governs distribution, Section 134
still defines "next of kin" as those who take the unbequeathed assets
of a decedent and hence the statute regulating intestate succession
remains effectual in breaking down the recipients into classes. Should
this latter construction be adopted, the federal act and the New York
statute will be substantially alike.
On returning to an analysis of the adjudicated cases, it is dlear
both in New York and under the FELA that since the death dam-
ages form no part of the assets of the estate, the proceeds are im-
mune from creditors' claims and are not subject to the payment
of decedent's debts.1 1  It would seem that since "next of kin"
is defined as those who would take in intestacy, those merely stand-
ing in locus parentis, step-parents, and the natural parents of
adopted children are excluded as beneficiaries. 10 2  Other decisions
have made plain the fact that it is of no consequence that the bene-
101 In re Butler 20 F. Supp. 995 (W. D. Va. 1937) (FELA) ; Matter of
Ehret, 247 App. biv. 456, 288 N. Y. Supp. 122 (2d Dep't 1936). However,
by Section 189 of the New York Lien Law, a lien attaches against the proceeds
in favor of a hospital for the reasonable charges for treatment of decedent
prior to his death provided only that expenses of hospital treatment and medi-
cal care were elements of damage in the death action.
102 See Note, 56 A. L. R. 1349 (1928). For a discussion of exclusion on
moral grounds (abandonment, marital misconduct, etc.), see Notes, 18 A. L. R.
1409 (1922) ; 90 A. L. R. 920 (1934).
[ VOL. 24
NOTES AND COMMENT
ficiary is an alien.103 The contributory negligence of the beneficiary
is no bar to his recovery either in New York or under federal law,
and thus in an unusual case, damages were awarded in favor of
the husband and sole next of kin of deceased, whose negligence was
alone responsible for her death, against the owner of a car (which
the husband had borrowed and was driving at the time of the acci-
dent) by imputing the husband's negligence to the owner under
Section 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
10 4
Death Damages Under the Warsaw Convention.10 5
Just as the circumstances of a particular case may serve to
bring it within the scope of the FELA, thereby supplanting the law
of New York, a death action may arise which falls within the scope
of the Warsaw Treaty 106 in which case New York law is of only
limited applicability. In order to present a three-dimensional pic-
ture of death liability in New York, it is fitting that the provisions
of this treaty be discussed.
The convention's creation arose out of the necessity for having
some international law which would establish a uniform code of
liability of those flying between various countries, and which would
replace the mass of conflicting local statutes with standard proce-
dures and remedies, that would in turn perform the social function
of encouraging aviation and aiding it to grow and prosper.
The treaty applies to "all international transportation of per-
sons, baggage or goods" by air.'0 7 By "international transportation"
is meant any transportation in which "according to the contract made
by the parties" the place of departure and the place of destination
are situated within the territories of two parties to the Convention 108
103 Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y. 343, 114 N. E. 399 (1916), error
dismissed, 248 U. S. 369 (1919); McGovern v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 235
U. S. 389 (1914) (FELA).
104 Rozewski v. Rozewski, 181 Misc. 793, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 743 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
loA Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air, and an Additional Protocol Thereto, concluded
at Warsaw on October 12, 1929. Adherence advised by the Senate of the
United States with reservation, June 15, 1934 (legislative eay of June 6, 1934).
Adherence declared by the President of the United States, with reservation,
June 27, 1934. Declaration of adherence of the United States deposited at
Warsaw, July 31, 1934. Proclaimed by the President of the United States,
October 29, 1934.
106 U. S. TREATY SER. No. 876 (Dep't State 1934). The entire French and
English texts of the Convention may also be found in 49 STAT. 3000 (1934).
107 Article I, § 1.
108 Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. S. 2d
420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), 1943 U. S. Av. R. 1 (1943), aff'd without opinion, 267
App. Div. 947, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (1st Dep't 1944), affd without opinion, 293
N. Y. 878, 59 N. E. 2d 785 (1945), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 882 (1945) (where
passenger died in plane which disappeared over the Pacific Ocean on route
from San Francisco to Hong Kong).
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or within the territory of a single party if there is an agreed stopping
place within the territory of any foreign nation even though that
foreign naion is not a party to the Convention.'"0 In effect, whether
or not a trip is international depends upon the contract between the
parties, not upon the flight of the plane or the place of the accident,
and thus if the contract so reads, and the Convention's other condi-
tions are met, the terms of the treaty may bind a passenger on a
purely local flight when it is part of an international flight as defined
above. In an illuminating article in the Virginia Law Review,
George W. Orr gives the following example :110
For instance, the United States and Mexico are parties to the Convention;
Cuba is not. A ticket or contract from Chicago to Mexico City would sub-
ject that whole flight to the Convention. If injury were sustained at Chicago
in taking off, even though this accident happened on a portion of the flight,
say, from Chicago to St. Louis, the Convention would apply as to those
passengers holding tickets from Chicago to Mexico City. Naturally, it would
not apply to any passengers aboard who held tickets only from Chicago to
St. Louis, so it is possible to have passengers aboard both subject and not sub-ject to the Convention, all in the same accident. The Convention would not
apply to passengers, for instance, from Miami to Cuba, even though this is an
international flight in the usual sense of that term, as Cuba is not a party to
the Convention. But a return ticket from Miami to Cuba to Miami (or any
other point in the United States) would be subject to the Convention as the
point of departure and the place of destination would be within the jurisdic-
tion of a party to the Convention and there would be an agreed stopping place
in a foreign jurisdiction, it not being necessary that the jurisdiction of the
agreed stopping place be that of a party to the C6nvention. Therefore, if
passengers or goods were injured on the take-off from Miami or the landing
at Havana, some of the passengers might be subject to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, those with return tickets to Miami, while others, those with one way
tickets, would not be subject to the Convention.
Once it has been determined that the flight was "international
transportation," and once it is demonstrated that the prescribed con-
ditions as to the character of the ticket or contract 111 have been
complied with, the terms of the Convention raise a presumption of
liability against the carrier,112 subject to certain enumerated de-
fenses," 3 and what is most important, the liability of the carrier is
expressly limited unless wilful misconduct has been shown." 4
109 Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N. Y. S.
2d 317 (2d Dep't 1945), 1945 U. S. Av. R. 39, af'd, 295 N. Y. 852, 67 N. E.
2d 257 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 741 (1946) (round trip ticket to New
York with stopping place at Lisbon, Portugal).
110 Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REV. 423, 428 (1945). The
author states that ". . . this article was written from the viewpoint of infor-
mation to a person with no knowledge of the Convention and intended merely
as an introduction to the basic ideas and principles involved."
1l Article III, § 1.
112 Article XVII.
113 Article XX.
114 Article XXV.
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Article XXII of the Convention limits the damages recoverable
for death or injury to a passenger to 125,000 gold francs of a fixed
fineness which today equals $8,291.87 in United States currency.
Thus, the plaintiff in a death action would receive up to this sum
without any showing of negligence or fault, unless the carrier can
show that its servants, including those in the airplane, were free
from all fault. As a practical matter, that is extremely difficult if
not impossible for every accident generally results in the substantial
destruction of all equipment and the death of the parties involved.
This maximum recovery for death, what we in the United
States would regard as a relatively modest sum, has been both bit-
terly criticized and staunchly defended. The reasons put forth by
those in favor of retaining the present limitation may be divided into
the "quid pro quo" argument and the "social interest" argument.
By the former, they claim that in exchange for the limitation, the
burden of proof has been shifted; in exchange for the speed and
convenience of airliners, the passenger accepts the attendant risks
when he selects this mode of travel in preference to rail, ship, or
motor. By the latter, they point to the reduction of litigation, and
to the decrease in insurance rates for airlines which in return re-
duces costs and stimulates a young and growing industry. Further,
it is asserted, the passenger can, if he chooses, purchase individual
trip insurance at a very reasonable fee. In addition, we are reminded
that unanimity was the compelling motive behind the treaty and
that any increase would force those countries in which the human
life is worth less to withdraw, and would forever dissuade those
countries which still haven't ratified from ever doing so.115
The proponents of an increase claim that the shifting of the
burden of proof merely gave what was already available by the doc-
trine of res ipso loquitur and that the maximum liability is grossly
inadequate and inequitable by American standards.11 6
The courts of New York are bound to apply this liability limi-
tation when the facts of the case warrant it, notwithstanding the
1"s See, e.g., Allen, Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers,
2 J. Azi. L. 325 (1936); Butler, Limitations of Air Carriers Tort Liability
and Related Insurance Coverage-A Proposed Federal Air Passenger Liability
Act, 11 AIR. L. REv. 262 (1940) ; Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase
the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR. L. & C. 53
(1949) ; Parker, The Adequacy of the Passenger Liability Limits of the War-
saw Conventio; of 1929, 14 J. AIR. L. & C. 37 (1947) ; R. Henberg, Lintita-
tions of Airliw Passenger Liability, 6 J. AIR. L. 365 (1935).
126 On January 30, 1950, Rep. Latham of New York introduced H. J. R. 406
directing the Civil Aeronautics Board to procure an amendment to the Warsaw
Convention with reference to the limitation of liability on international air
travel. It would also require the carrier to secure insurance in behalf of each
passenger of not less than $25,000, the cost thereof to be added to the price
of the ticket. H. J. R. 406 was referred to the House Comnittee on Foreign
Affairs. See also Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MicH.
L. REv. 41 (1948).
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constitutional provision which forbids a limitation on wrongful death
recoveries. This is so, because by its nature as a treaty, the Warsaw
Convention ranks with the Federal Constitution as the supreme law
of the land and transcends all conflicting state laws. It has been
held that the treaty is self-executing and that it is constitutional and
in derogation of no power of Congress and no personal right." 7 No
right of action for wrongful death is found in the Convention so the
beneficiaries of the action and the substantive law of damages would
have to be ascertained by the death statute of the place of the acci-
dent." 8 Thus, the New York law discussed above, would control only
when the accident occurs in this jurisdiction. However, by Article
XXVIII of the Convention, the plaintiff has the option of bringing
the action in the courts of: (1) the carrier's domicile, (2) the car-
rier's principal place of business, (3) the place of business through
which the contract of carriage was made, or (4) the place of destin-
ation. Since by the same Article, all questions of procedure are
to be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
the adjective law of New York may be applicable when, in any of
the above instances, the action is brought here.
JusTiN L. ViGDOR,
JAMES P. KEHOE.
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 84 OF THE CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT
The word arbitration is ordinarily applied to an extrajudicial
hearing and determination of a matter or matters of difference be-
tween contending parties by arbiters either chosen by the parties in-
volved, or appointed by the court.' The decision rendered is called
an award. This procedure may embrace either international, labor,
or commercial controversies. The discussion herein will be limited
to the last mentioned type of dispute.
The inception of this special type of proceeding occurred early
in man's history. The Greeks and Romans were familiar with its
process, and from the charters that were issued to the English guilds,
117 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 1945
U. S. Av. R. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
I'8 Choy v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1941 U. S. Av. R. 10, 1942 U. S.
Av. R. 93.
16 WIu.IsroN, CONTRACTS § 1918 (rev. ed. 1938); see invaluable sym-
posium on arbitration in 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 119 (1934).
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